DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY WOLF JR DATE 5/25/82
RDS☐or XDS☐EXT. DATE
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TUNISIA AND MOROCCO

If the French should ask for specific suggestions from us as to what they might do to improve the political situation in French North Africa, we have the following in mind:

a) Freedom of the press. This should offer no major obstacle as this reform is already granted in Tunisia and as local Moroccan Communist publications, which publish the objectionable material, enjoy virtually free circulation. Communist material from Metropolitan France also enjoys virtually free circulation in Morocco as well as in Tunisia.

b) Freedom of assembly. At the present time the French prohibition has interfered little with the growth of the Moroccan Nationalist movement and has been obviously violated in Tunisia through the use of the UGTT labor union as a political vehicle.

c) The admittance in 1947-48 of some specified number of Moroccans and Tunisians to the French National School of Administration or to other such training institutions, these numbers to be increased as the simultaneous program of public education develops.

d) The immediate training of teachers and the adoption of a school program, including professional schools. A time table is felt to be specially important in this case with a definite accent on punctual fulfillment of the first installment within such a very brief period as one or two years.

e) Speeding up and implementing the French plan for administrative reforms; immediate introduction of educated Moslems in as many posts as practicable.

f) As planned now by the French, the inauguration of political education with the initiation of Moslems to democracy through municipal elections.

Based on its experience in the Philippines, the United States believes that a liberal and farsighted policy will lead to Morocco and Tunisia seeking voluntarily French guidance in many fields at the end of the period of evolution.

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ALGERIA

It is felt that in any approach to the French Government the subject of Algeria be treated separately for reasons to be found in the agreed findings, and that the French be told:

1) In the preceding remarks it will be noted that the American Government has mentioned only the North African situation as evident in Morocco and Tunisia, for it recognizes the different situation existing in Algeria, resulting from many factors:

A) Over 100 years of French presence.

B) The considerably greater extent of French settlement and participation in all phases of local life.

C) The more acute economic situation resulting from the greater tapping of all available natural resources.

D) The importance of the French population element.

E) The tenser relations between Moslems and "colons", based on the above and other reasons.

F) The greater class consciousness of the Algerian Nationalist leaders.

2) The American Government also recognizes the French Government's sincere attempt to improve the political situation through the Algerian Statute.

3) At the same time and in order to create the best atmosphere for its success, it is believed that the Statute might well be implemented by:

A) Further social and educational advancement of the Moslem population, France's past accomplishments, specially in the field of hygiene, being fully appreciated.

B) Inclusion of as many Moslems in the administration as possible, and training of Moslems for such posts, etc.

C) Elaboration of an economic program with special emphasis on the creation of new industries to relieve the demographic pressure now becoming specially acute in Algeria where further agricultural possibilities are far less promising than in Morocco for several reasons.

NORTH

NORTH AFRICAN WHEAT PRODUCTION

In connection with any economic aid for North Africa under the Marshall Plan, there should be mentioned the subject of wheat and the views in this regard of Brigadier General Thomas D. Campbell (Ret), who is the biggest wheat grower in the United States and whose farms are located on semi-arid land said to be quite similar to that found in French North Africa. General Campbell has raised wheat in Montana very successfully due primarily to his own methods of tillage and the conservation of moisture in the soil. General Campbell claims 1) that if the proper methods are used, wheat can be grown just as successfully in North Africa as in Montana, 2) that there are approximately 20 million acres in North Africa which could be cultivated, 3) that within a few years this area could supply all of Western Europe with its wheat requirements, 4) that the French possess, in the form of surplus equipment purchased from the United States, all the machinery necessary for such an undertaking and that, therefore, it is unnecessary that in the immediate future they purchase scarce and expensive tractors or that they build additional railroads. Furthermore, General Campbell has stated that he is willing to offer his services without charge to the French Government to assist in such a plan, and he has pointed out the urgent necessity to Ambassador Bonnet of developing North Africa's wheat potentials, emphasizing 1) that huge United States surpluses of wheat may not continue in the next few years and 2) that France can ill afford to spend dollars for expensive wheat that she could raise cheaply just across the Mediterranean.

General Campbell was introduced to the French Ambassador in June. He outlined his ideas to Mr. Bonnet, and it was our hope that, on the basis of the report of this conversation to the French Foreign Office, General Campbell might be invited by the French Government to assist them in increasing the wheat production of French North Africa. So far, little or nothing has developed from this, but it is intended that when French economic officials arrive here in October, the subject shall once again be mentioned to them with the specific recommendation that they avail themselves of the services proffered by General Campbell. General Campbell's ideas are very sound, his reputation as a successful farmer and businessman is incomparable, and we believe that every encouragement should be given to a project which has chances of greatly increasing the wheat production of French North Africa.

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MEMORANDUM

TO : The Secretary October 1, 1947

FROM : NEA - Mr. Henderson

THROUGH: S/S

SUBJECT: Disposition of the Former Italian Colonies in Africa.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY _____ DATE 5/25/82
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Problem

The problem is to determine the policy of this Government concerning the final disposal of Italy's territorial possessions in Africa, namely, Libya (comprising Tripolitania and Cyrenaica), Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland.

Recommendations

It is recommended that the policy of the United States with respect to the future of each of these territories should be as follows:

1. Libya. That Libya be placed under the international trusteeship system, with the Government of the United Kingdom as the administering authority, under terms of trusteeship which would provide for the people of Libya to become self-governing at the expiration of a period of ten years from the date of the establishment of such trusteeship, at which time Tripolitania and Cyrenaica would be permitted individually to elect whether they desire to (a) become separate independent states, (b) remain united as an independent Libya, or (c) become federated with other states or territories.

2. Eritrea. That Eritrea be ceded in full sovereignty to Ethiopia, except for the area in the northwestern part of Eritrea inhabited by Moslem-Sudanese, which should be incorporated into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

3. Italian Somaliland. That Italian Somaliland, together with British Somaliland, be placed under the international trusteeship system, with the Government of the United Kingdom as the administering authority, under terms of trusteeship which would provide for eventual self-government but which would not fix the period of time within which the area would become self-governing.

Discussion

Discussion

At meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers concerning the Peace Treaty with Italy, various proposals were made regarding the disposal of the Italian Colonies in Africa. These proposals, as well as what are believed to be the present attitudes of the Governments of Italy, Ethiopia, and Egypt, and of the Arab League, have been summarized in Annex I to this memorandum. The Foreign Ministers were unable to agree upon any definitive solution to the problem. They finally agreed in principle, however, to a suggestion of the United States Delegation that Italy be required to renounce sovereignty over the Colonies, which would be held in trust by the Four Powers for a period of one year from the coming into force of the Peace Treaty with Italy, during which time the Foreign Ministers would endeavor to determine jointly the final disposal of these territories. This principle was incorporated in Article 23 and Annex XI of the Italian Peace Treaty (see Annex II)

In the present international situation, none of the proposals previously made regarding the disposition of the Italian Colonies is satisfactory from the point of view of the United States and the Western World.

It is in the interests of United States security to prevent any potentially hostile power from obtaining a hold in the Middle East, the Mediterranean area, or in Africa. It would, therefore, be contrary to the policy of the United States, and to United States military interests, to accept any disposition of the Italian Colonies which would give the Soviet Union either unilateral or joint control of any of the colonies in question, even if this control were obtained in the guise of a trusteeship under the United Nations. The objections to collective trusteeship are based on our difficulties in obtaining Soviet cooperation in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Korea.

A decision to grant any of the Italian Colonies immediate independence would result in the creation of weak states which would be exposed to Soviet aggression or infiltration. Moreover, the Soviet Union could exercise effective control over any of these Colonies if their administration should be entrusted to a state in which there is a possibility that a communist government may come into power. For this reason, it would be disadvantageous to the United States to allow Italy to resume control of any of its former colonies unless it had previously become clear that the future Government of Italy will be non-communist and affiliated with the Western democracies. This consideration is over and above the consideration of whether Italy would be able to maintain peace in the Colonies, which appears to be

doubtful

doubtful in view of the limited armed forces permitted Italy by the Peace Treaty. It is doubtful also that the Italian Colonies in Africa could ever become self-sustaining, and their return to Italy would place an added burden on Italy's already strained economy. Nor would the return of the Colonies to Italy alone solve that country's problem of over-population.

Aside from the foregoing considerations, it is believed that the Arabs in Libya would resist by force any return to Italian rule. In view of the strong ties existing between the various states of the Arab world, armed conflict in Libya between Italian forces and local Arab forces would be extremely harmful to the interests of the United States. Moreover, any action by the United States openly supporting the return of the Colonies to Italian administration would further impair our relations with the Arab states, which are already strained as a result of the Palestine and Egyptian issues. Among other damaging results, a hostile attitude on the part of the Arabs would threaten from the rear the position we are striving to hold in Greece, Turkey, and Iran.

On September 19, an Aide-Memoire was received from the British Embassy stating that, now that the Italian Treaty has come into force and the year has begun within which the Four Powers are to decide upon the disposal of the Italian Colonies, the British Government would welcome a meeting of the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers at an early date to discuss procedural matters in connection with the implementation of Article 23 and Annex XI of the Treaty, including instructions to be given to the Commission, and to decide on the future program generally. It seems highly unlikely, however, that agreement will be reached by the Foreign Ministers. The question of the disposition of these Colonies, therefore, will in all probability go before the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In view of the situation in the Mediterranean area, we cannot wait until the commission of investigation has had time to visit the areas and make its report to decide what our attitude regarding the future of the Italian Colonies will be. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Great Britain would be our most probable and most important ally in the event of another war, and it would be extremely unfortunate, from our point of view, for British troops and materiel to be removed from the Near Eastern area. There is already a tendency in certain British circles to withdraw entirely from the Near and Middle East, leaving no great Power established

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in that area and thus exposing it to Russian aggression or infiltration unless the United States is prepared to fill the vacuum. We strongly believe, therefore, that Britain should continue to maintain a base in the Eastern Mediterranean area, and that facilities must at all times be available somewhere in the area of Palestine-Egypt-Cyrenaica which will enable the United Kingdom sea, land, and air forces to operate in this area. It appears unlikely that the British can continue to maintain bases in Palestine. Moreover, we believe that British troops should be unconditionally withdrawn from Egypt at the earliest practicable date and that bases in Cyrenaica are the only available substitutes. Cyrenaica is, therefore, more important than ever from the point of view of British and United States strategic interests. It has already been decided that we should inform the British Government that if it would like to transfer its troops and material from Egypt to Cyrenaica immediately, we would have no objection thereto; and that we would be disposed eventually to support arrangements for the establishment of permanent British bases in Cyrenaica, when the final disposition of that territory is decided, provided such arrangements could be effected in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and provided the making of such arrangements proves to be practicable in the light of the then existing international situation.

It is accordingly recommended that the United States support the principle of placing Libya under the international trusteeship system with the Government of the United Kingdom as the administering authority. The terms of trusteeship should provide for the peoples of Libya to become self-governing at the end of ten years from the date of the establishment of such trusteeship, at which time Tripolitania and Cyrenaica shall be permitted to elect individually whether they desire to become separate independent states, remain united as an independent Libya, or become federated with other states or territories. By making a definite provision in the trusteeship agreement for self-government at the end of ten years, there would appear to be a good chance that this proposal would be acceptable to the Arab states. It might be possible, particularly in case the friendly backing of the Arab world could be obtained, to rally the two-thirds vote in the General Assembly necessary to give Great Britain a non-strategic trusteeship over Libya. Also, in view of the friendly relations existing between the British Government and the Senussi, an independent state of Cyrenaica, or even an independent Libya, might be willing to give the British Government permanent bases in Cyrenaica.

The Government of Ethiopia has made claims to Eritrea. From exhaustive study given this question in the Department, we feel that there is ample historical, ethnological, linguistic, religious, and economic justification for the cession to Ethiopia, with appropriate

safeguards

safeguards, of the greater part of Eritrea, which would provide Ethiopia with its much needed access to the sea. It has recently been reported from Ethiopian sources that both Great Britain and the Soviet Union have given Ethiopia assurances on the Eritrean question. If Ethiopia is unsuccessful in obtaining this area, one of two courses appears to be likely: (1) Ethiopia will fall into the hands of reactionaries and be set back many years politically, economically, and socially; or (2) Ethiopia may turn towards the Soviets. From a strategic standpoint, Ethiopia is becoming increasingly important to British Empire security and, therefore, to our own security. An increase in Soviet influence in Ethiopia would constitute a direct threat to British control of the strategically important southern entrance to the Red Sea. It is known that the British Government is establishing bases in Kenya Colony and is considering plans for a central African life-line extending from Nigeria to Kenya. We understand that British troops and materiel already are being transferred to Kenya from India. It is in the interest of Great Britain to protect the flanks of this life-line, and it seems obvious to us that a strong, friendly, and peaceful Ethiopia is necessary to achieve this purpose. We recommend that Eritrea be ceded in full sovereignty to Ethiopia, except for the northwestern part, which is inhabited by Moslem-Sudanese who are more closely akin to the peoples of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan than to the Ethiopians and which, we believe, should be incorporated into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

Because of the strategic location of Italian Somaliland with respect to Kenya colony and the Aden protectorate, we believe that it would be advantageous to the United States and Great Britain for the latter country to assume responsibility for the future administration of Italian Somaliland. It would thus appear that the most desirable solution is for Italian Somaliland to be administered along with British Somaliland as a unit, and for the area so created to be placed under the international trusteeship system with the Government of the United Kingdom as the administering authority. We are opposed, however, to the proposal previously made by Great Britain for joining Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, and the Ogaden Province of Ethiopia under an international trusteeship. We see no justification for including the Ogaden, which is and should remain a part of Ethiopia. In view of the backward state of development of the Somalilands, no definite time for their attainment of self-government should be specified in the trusteeship agreement, but the agreement should provide for their development toward eventual self-government.

Loy W. Henderson

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ANNEX I

The following is a summary of the various proposals which have been made by the Delegations at the meetings of the Foreign Ministers regarding the disposal of the former Italian Colonies in Africa, together with a summary of what are believed to be the present attitudes of the Governments of Italy, Ethiopia, and Egypt, and of the Arab League:

1. USSR. The Soviet Union originally favored the principle of individual trusteeship as the solution for the disposal of the Italian Colonies. At the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September 1945, however, the Soviet Government agreed to the principle of collective trusteeship, with the United Nations as the administering authority, except for Tripolitania which it desired be placed under its own trusteeship. At that time, Mr. Molotov made a statement to the press indicating that the USSR also was interested in Eritrea.

During the fourth meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Soviet Delegate proposed, on April 29, 1946, that the Italian Colonies be placed under the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations with each Colony being administered by one of the Big Four and Italy under terms of trusteeship which would provide for independence at the end of a ten-year period, and that the Chief Administrator be appointed by the Allied Power and the Deputy Administrator be appointed by Italy. The Soviet Government also proposed that there be a five-man advisory council in each Colony consisting of two natives and one representative of each of the other members of the Big Four. After it became apparent that the Foreign Ministers would not be able to reach agreement on this question, Mr. Molotov stated without qualification, on May 10, 1946, that the Soviet Union was prepared to abandon its proposal for an individual trusteeship for Tripolitania and accept the French proposal that all of the Italian Colonies be placed under the trusteeship of Italy for a specified period of time, and that he would have no objection to acceptance of the ten-year period proposed by the United States. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that the Soviet Union may renew its demands for an individual trusteeship over Tripolitania, Eritrea, or both.

2. UK. The United Kingdom Government originally took the position that Italy should be required to renounce sovereignty over all of its territorial possessions in Africa and agree to accept any arrangements made subsequently by the interested powers regarding the disposition of these territories. At the fourth meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris, on April 29, 1946, the UK Delegation proposed that Libya be granted independence as a unit and that the Council of Foreign Ministers, or the Trusteeship Council, explore the possibility of ceding Eritrea to Ethiopia and joining

Italian

Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, and the Ogaden Province of Ethiopia under an international trusteeship. On May 10, 1946, Mr. Bevin stated that he was prepared to accept on his own responsibility, and without authority from his Government, the principle of Italian trusteeship for all of the former Italian Colonies except Cyrenaica, which he asked be left under British trusteeship, and on the understanding that there would be an adjustment in the boundary between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica which would permit the majority of the Senussi to remain in Cyrenaica; and on the understanding also that the Senussi would never again be permitted to come under Italian rule, in accordance with the promise given to them by the UK Government during the war. He made a strong appeal for acceptance of the British trusteeship over Cyrenaica, emphasizing security needs and stating that the UK could accept no solution which would not leave the vital area between Bengazi and Tobruk under British control. Also, Mr. Bevin indicated that the claims of Ethiopia in regard to Eritrea would have to be taken into consideration and that the UK Government favored a special arrongement for Italian Somaliland.

3. France. The French Government has consistently taken the position that the Italian Colonies in Africa should be placed under the international trusteeship system with Italy as an administering authority, but has opposed any proposal setting a definite period of time within which the colonies would become independent.

4. At the meetings of the Foreign Ministers, the United States consistently advocated the principle of collective trusteeship as the best method of assuring the development of the Italian Colonies towards self-government, except for an area in southeastern Eritrea, known as the Assab area, which should be ceded to Ethiopia. In view of the wide divergence between the positions of the various Delegations, however, and in a desire to find an acceptable solution, the United States Delegate finally stated that this Government would be prepared to agree to the proposal of the French Delegation that the Colonies be placed under Italian trusteeship, provided the time limits for trusteeship (ten years in the case of both Libya and Eritrea) set forth in the United States proposal were accepted. This proposal, however, was objected to by the French Delegation and the proposal made by the British regarding Cyrenaica was still outstanding. The Secretary stated at a restricted session of the Foreign Ministers on May 13, 1946 that, despite the concessions made, there still was no agreement. He therefore suggested that Italy should be required to renounce sovereignty over the Colonies, which would be held in trust by the Four Powers for a period of one year, during which they would endeavor to reach agreement as to the kind of trusteeship under which the Colonies would be placed. This suggestion was finally agree to in principle by all of the Delegations and has

been

been incorporated in Article 23 and Annex XI of the Italian Peace Treaty.

5. Italy. The policy of the Government of Italy has been directed toward endeavoring to preserve Italian administration of the three colonial areas in Africa.

6. Ethiopia. Ethiopia has strongly requested the cession to it in full sovereignty of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. The country's claims are based primarily on ethnic, historical, economic, and geographic factors and Ethiopia's need for an outlet to the sea.

7. Egypt. At the Paris Peace Conference, the Egyptian Delegation demanded that the independence and sovereignty of Libya should be recognized and proclaimed by the Conference. Egypt maintained that if it were necessary for Libya to remain temporarily under the tutelage of a foreign power, a member of the Arab League should be given a trusteeship over the Colony. Egypt has also made claims to Eritrea, and the oasis of Giarabub and the plateau of Salum, in Libya.

8. Arab League. Under the leadership of Azzam Pasha, the Arab League has shown an active interest in the future of the Italian Colonies, particularly Libya. Azzam Pasha has stated that he thinks it might be preferable for Cyrenaica to be united with another Arab country, which in this case would be Egypt, and for the United States to take over the trusteeship for Tripolitania with a provision for the reconsideration of the question at the end of a specified period of years. As a last resort, Azzam Pasha believes that the Arab League would accept a United Nations trusteeship over Libya, provided that none of the big Powers would act as the administering authority and that the trusteeship agreement provide for a transitional period of from five to ten years, at the end of which time Libya would become completely independent.

Azzam Pasha also has stated emphatically that Italian administration in "any shape, form, or color" would not be tolerated by the inhabitants of Libya, and that there would be war against the administrators. He has said that neither the Russians nor the French would be acceptable to the inhabitants, but that a small percentage of them might be in favor of a British administration.

According to Azzam Pasha, the Arab League does not wish to see Great Britain withdraw completely from the Near East. He has suggested Trans-Jordan, Kuwait, and Cyrenaica as possible sites for British bases.

ANNEX II

Article 23

1. Italy renounces all right and title to the Italian territorial possessions in Africa, i.e. Libya, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.

2. Pending their final disposal, the said possessions shall continue under their present administration.

3. The final disposal of these possessions shall be determined jointly by the Governments of the Soviet Union, of the United Kingdom, of the United States of America, and of France within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty, in the manner laid down in the joint declaration of February 10, 1947, issued by the said Governments, which is reproduced in Annex XI.

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ANNEX XI

Joint Declaration by the Governments of the Soviet Union, of the United Kingdom, of the United States of America and of France concerning Italian Territorial Possessions in Africa

(See Article 23)

1. The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the United States of America, and of France agree that they will, within one year from the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Italy bearing the date of February 10, 1947, jointly determine the final disposal of Italy's territorial possessions in Africa, to which, in accordance with Article 23 of the Treaty, Italy renounces all right and title.

2. The final disposal of the territories concerned and the appropriate adjustment of their boundaries shall be made by the Four Powers in the light of the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants and the interests of peace and security, taking into consideration the views of other interested Governments.

3. If with respect to any of these territories the Four Powers are unable to agree upon their disposal within one year from the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, the matter shall be referred to the General Assembly of the United Nations for a recommendation, and the Four Powers agree to accept the recommendation and

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to take appropriate measures for giving effect to it.

4. The Deputies of the Foreign Ministers shall continue the consideration of the question of the disposal of the former Italian Colonies with a view to submitting to the Council of Foreign Ministers their recommendations on this matter. They shall also send out commissions of investigation to any of the former Italian Colonies in order to supply the Deputies with the necessary data on this question and to ascertain the views of the local population.